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 Zusammenfassung 
 
Die Europäische Kommission hat in ihrem „Klima- und Energiepaket“ vom Januar 2008 eine 
Weichenstellung für den europäischen Emissionshandel vorgeschlagen. Bislang wurden die 
Zertifikate an die betroffenen Unternehmen aus den energieintensiven Sektoren kostenfrei 
vergeben. Nach den Plänen der Kommission sollen Stromproduzenten ab 2013 alle benötigten 
Zertifikate ersteigern müssen. Unternehmen aus anderen energieintensiven Branchen sollen 
zunächst nur 20 % ersteigern, in 2020 dann 100 %. Da insgesamt mindestens zwei Drittel 
aller Zertifikate versteigert werden, ist zu erwarten, dass der freie Markt für Zertifikate ab 
2013 deutlich dünner sein wird als dies bisher der Fall ist. Aus diesem Grund gewinnt das 
Design der Auktion an Bedeutung, denn vom Auktionspreis, der die Knappheit an 
Zertifikaten signalisieren soll, werden wichtige Investitionsentscheidungen in CO2-arme 
Technologien abhängen. Eventuelle Fehler im Auktionsdesign können, wenn die Zertifikate 
überwiegend versteigert werden, nicht mehr durch einen liquiden freien Markt „geheilt“ 
werden. 
Das vorliegende Papier entwickelt Kriterien, nach denen unterschiedliche Auktionsdesigns für 
die Versteigerung von Zertifikaten bewertet werden können. Von zentraler Bedeutung für die 
Bewertung einer Auktion sind (i) verlässliche Preissignale, die die Knappheit der Zertifikate 
richtig widerspiegeln, (ii) die Vergabe der Zertifikate an Bieter mit der höchsten 
Wertschätzung und (iii) Transparenz und Glaubwürdigkeit in der Durchführung.  
Unsere Analyse zeigt, dass eine Auktion für Zertifikate die folgenden Eigenschaften 
aufweisen sollte, um die genannten Kriterien zu erfüllen: Erstens, die Auktion sollte in Form 
einer „doppelten Auktion“ durchgeführt werden, d.h., ein Unternehmen sollte sowohl 
Zertifikate anbieten als auch nachfragen können. Zweitens, die Auktion sollte als 
„dynamische Auktion“ mit aufsteigendem Preis durchgeführt werden. Diese Auktionsform 
hat den großen Vorteil, dass die Bieter aus der Information über die Überschussnachfrage bei 
einem bestimmten Preis ablesen können, wie knapp die Zertifikate tatsächlich sind. Alle 
erfolgreichen Nachfrager zahlen in der Auktion den gleichen Preis. Drittens, es sollten 
Auktionen für Zertifikate aus zwei unterschiedlichen Handelsphasen (Phase 2: 2008-2012 und 
Phase 3: 2013-2020) parallel durchgeführt werden um sicherzustellen, dass Zertifikate aus 
beiden Phasen erworben werden können. Viertens sollten die Auktionen regelmäßig und mit 
einer glaubwürdigen Ankündigung, wie viele Zertifikate wann versteigert werden, 
durchgeführt werden.  
Die einseitige Version dieser Auktion, bei der Unternehmen nur kaufen können, ist unter den 
zu erwartenden Marktbedingungen nicht geeignet, verlässliche Preissignale zu generieren. 
Zugleich sind die etwa in Deutschland durchgeführten direkten Verkäufe am freien 
Zertifikatmarkt in Phase 3 keine Alternative zu einer Auktion. Bei einem großen Angebot 
durch direkte Verkäufe auf einem dünnen Zertifikatmarkt ist eine Preisbeeinflussung höchst 
wahrscheinlich, was eine erhöhte Preisunsicherheit für die Marktteilnehmer zur Folge hat. 
 Non-technical Summary 
 
Our paper is motivated by the “Climate action and renewable energy package” proposed by 
the European Commission in the beginning of 2008. It suggests auctioning as basic principle 
for allocation for the upcoming third trading phase of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
(Phase 3) that runs from 2013 to 2020. Explicitly, in the power sector 100 % auctioning is 
proposed from 2013 onwards. In all other sectors it is suggested to start with an initial 
auctioning share of 20 % in 2013, to be increased to 100 % by 2020. Overall, it is estimated 
that at least two third of the total quantity of allowances will be auctioned in 2013. The drastic 
increase of auctioned allowances in contrast to grandfathering in the past will change the 
market structure in Phase 3. For a given cap, with an augmenting auction supply the 
possibility to purchase allowances in the secondary market decreases. As a consequence, 
market liquidity is extracted suggesting a thinner secondary market than in earlier trading 
phases.  
Based on the theoretical and empirical literature we firstly emphasize the importance of a 
properly chosen auction design as the significantly higher auction share, compared to the past 
and current trading phases, is expected to yield a thin, non-competitive secondary market for 
CO2 allowances. Secondly, we elaborate main criteria that a viable auction design is supposed 
to fulfil and propose a specific auctions design for Phase 3. As criteria we state that the 
auction should create early and reliable price signals to support correct abatement decisions. 
The auction should also allocate the allowances to the firms that need them most, i.e. to the 
firms with the highest marginal abatement costs. Additionally, it should be designed simple 
and transparent to enhance trust and credibility of the market in the trading scheme and thus 
enforce intensive participation. Thirdly, we recommend a specific auction design. We argue 
that the regulator should apply a simultaneous dynamic uniform double auction, in order to 
achieve best the above mentioned criteria. In this auction firms may both buy and sell 
allowances. The dynamic implementation ensures that bidders get information over the 
scarcity of the allowances from the excess demand. Furthermore, all successful bidders pay 
the same price per allowance. In addition, we conclude that auctioning allowances of future 
trading phases is necessary to reduce future price uncertainty. Most effectively, this can be 
realized by an auction that offers allowances of the current and successive trading phase 
simultaneously.  
We conclude that the most common auction design – the one-sided uniform auction – does 
not comply with all proposed criteria as it is not able to guarantee reliable prices. Besides, we 
discourage from direct sales, as they are currently executed in Germany, as alternative to 
standard auctions. With an increasing auction volume direct sales which are rather in-
transparent may cause price effects in a thin secondary market and thus may increase price 
uncertainty in the trading scheme.  
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Abstract 
The “Climate action and renewable energy package” proposed by the European Commission 
in the beginning of 2008 suggests auctioning as basic principle for allocation for the 
upcoming third trading phase of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme that runs from 2013 to 
2020. Overall, it is estimated that at least two third of the total quantity of allowances will be 
auctioned in 2013, to be increased to 100 % by 2020. In this paper, we emphasize the 
importance of a properly chosen auction design as the significantly higher auction share, 
compared to the past and current trading phase, is expected to yield a thin secondary market 
for CO2 allowances. We elaborate main criteria that a viable auction design is supposed to 
fulfil and propose a specific auction design for the third trading phase. The auction we 
recommend is a simultaneous dynamic uniform double auction. 
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1. Introduction 
The EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) represents one corner stone of Europe’s 
strategy to mitigate emissions of greenhouse gases. Implementing a political viable allocation 
rule for the scheme constitutes a major challenge for the regulator, as some misspecifications 
might yield severe economic damages for the system, as experiences from the first trading 
phase (or Phase 1: 2005-2007) have shown. Currently, the European Commission (EC) – the 
regulator for the EU ETS – is concerned with the implementation of the allocation rule for the 
third trading phase of the EU ETS, also known as Phase 3, running from 2013 to 2020. In 
contrast to the allocation plans of Phase 1 and Phase 2 (2008-2012), a considerable fraction of 
allowances is intended to be auctioned such that the importance of a well designed auction 
institution increases drastically. According to the Directive of the EC (EC 2008) at least two 
thirds of the total available allowance volume (ET budget) will be auctioned in 2013, to be 
increased to 100 % by 2020.  
The objectives of this paper are to elaborate main criteria by which relevant allocation 
mechanisms based on auctioning for Phase 3 can be evaluated and to propose a specific 
auction design that complies with these criteria: As with a significantly higher auction share it 
is plausible to expect a relatively thin secondary market for emission allowances, we argue 
that the allocation rule should foster the creation of early and reliable price signals. They help 
to reduce price uncertainty for future trading years and phases. Furthermore, an auction 
should allocate the allowances to firms that need them most, i.e. to firms with the highest 
marginal abatement costs. Both criteria support correct abatement decisions – the key element 
of emissions trading schemes (ETS). Additionally, an auction mechanism should be designed 
simple and transparent to make firms’ participation as easy as possible and to be secure from 
abuse and resistant to market manipulation. Thereby confidence and credibility in the trading 
system are enhanced. Although additional criteria like revenue maximization, political 
feasibility, and social acceptance also have to be considered, they are secondary from the 
firms’ point of view and thus do not constitute the focus of our analysis. Additional to 
auctioning, we include the possibility of free allocation in proportion to historical emissions 
or output (grandfathering) as part of the allocation process. With respect to auctioning we 
distinguish between standard auctions and auctions executed as direct sales into the market. 
We obtain our results by studying already existing auctions for ETS in combination with 
standard auction theory.  
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Our analysis reveals that, independent of the existence of grandfathering, the 
simultaneous dynamic uniform double auction (in which firms may act as buyers and sellers) 
is able to fulfil all criteria for the allocation rule. This auction is also known as simultaneous 
ascending clock auction allowing for a selling position. Not able to conform to the criteria is 
the one-sided counterpart (buying position only) in combination with free allocation, whose 
static version is applied already for selling allowances in Phase 2 of the EU ETS and is 
considered for other future trading schemes. In addition, we conclude that direct sales only 
constitute an attractive alternative to standard auctioning as long as the auctioned volume is 
relatively small.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the past 
regulatory frameworks with respect to allowance allocation for Phase 1 and Phase 2 together 
with the improvements planned by the EC for Phase 3. The criteria to a viable allocation 
mechanism that is based on auctioning are defined in Section 3. In Section 4 we introduce the 
pool of multi-unit auctions for (almost) identical objects and then evaluate already existing 
auction designs for emission allowances in terms of their compliance with the criteria. Based 
on these results and with regard to the future EU ETS market structure, in Section 5 we 
formulate recommendations for a viable auction design for Phase 3 together with first 
suggestions for its implementation. The paper ends with a brief conclusion in Section 6. 
2. Initial allocation rules in the EU ETS 
The EU ETS, established in 2005, is made up of consecutive trading phases. Currently we are 
in the second trading phase that runs from 2008 to 2012 (Phase 2). Initial allocation rules for 
Phase 1 and 2 are governed by the “EU ETS Directive” (EC 2003). The Directive specifies 
that at the end of every February a certain amount of allowances, i.e. the initial allocation, is 
allocated to the installations subject to emissions trading for the current trading year according 
to so-called “National Allocation Plans” (NAP). More precisely, they regulate the ET budget 
and the allocation rule for each trading phase. Thereby, typically two basic types of allocation 
rules are employed: auctioning and grandfathering. According to the Directive, grandfathering 
is the rule but EU Member States were permitted to auction off up to 5 % of the ET budget in 
Phase 1 and up to 10 % in Phase 2. Four Member States allowed for auctioning in Phase 1, 
eight in Phase 2; in any case, the shares to be auctioned were well below the allowed 
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maximum shares.1 In other words, until 2012 the EC has chosen a hybrid initial allocation 
scheme where some allowances are to be auctioned and the dominating part is to be 
grandfathered. 
For each upcoming trading phase it is the objective of the EC to refine and improve 
the EU ETS in the light of experiences gathered from the past. The current “Climate action 
and renewable energy package” proposed by the EC (EC 2008) suggests auctioning as the 
basic principle for allocation for Phase 3, i.e. there is a paradigm shift with respect to initial 
allocation. Explicitly, in the power sector 100 % auctioning is proposed from 2013 onwards. 
In all other sectors it is suggested to start with an initial auctioning share of 20 % in 2013, to 
be increased linearly to 100 % by 2020. However, the proposal introduces free allocation 
instead of auctioning as one measure to avoid potential competitiveness disadvantages of 
European industries from carbon regulation and so-called “carbon leakage”, i.e. the danger of 
loosing market share due to international competitors in non-regulated regions outside the EU 
and the associated relocation of CO2 emissions.  
Both methods of initial allocation, auctioning and grandfathering, are from a 
theoretical point of view neutral in their effect on marginal costs, but the use of 
grandfathering instead of auctioning has a positive effect on firms’ balance sheets. To what 
extent firms that are regulated by the EU ETS lose market shares depends on their market 
position and the carbon regulation prevailing for their competitors. Meanwhile, there are first 
studies that empirically tackle the question about the ability to pass-through carbon costs and 
its effects on firms’ market shares. The empirical results strengthen the use of full auctioning 
at least in the electricity sector. The IEA (2005) provides estimations for price elasticities of 
demand, and Zachmann and von Hirschhausen (2008) show that there is even asymmetric 
carbon cost pass-through in the case of German wholesale electricity prices. Löschel and 
Oberndorfer (2008) complement this finding by providing pass-through estimates for 
additional energy-intensive sectors. Their results suggest that there are important differences 
in pass-through behaviour at the sectoral and even sub-sectoral level. The calculations 
indicate, however, that strong ability to pass-through carbon costs as previously shown for the 
electricity industry might not be the rule. Given the difficulty to assess whether and to what 
extent sectors are likely to pass on the cost of carbon without loosing market shares, 
                                                 
1 The Member States employing auctions in Phase 1 are Denmark (5% of total allowances are auctioned), 
Hungary (2.5%), Ireland (0.75%), and Lithuania (1.5%). For Phase 2 the following countries have indicated their 
willingness to auction: Austria (1.3%), Belgium (0.3%), Germany (8.8%), Hungary (5%), Ireland (0.5%), 
Lithuania (2.8%), Netherlands (4%), Poland (1%), and UK (7%), see Schleich et al. (2008). 
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complementary indicators like the CO2 cost impacts and the trade intensity of carbon 
intensive products are proposed to identify sectors at risk of “carbon leakage” (Hourcade et al. 
2008, Oeko Institut 2008). Table 1 shows the EU ETS sectors, their energy intensity and trade 
intensity in 2005, and actual emissions and projections until 2020. Besides the EU auctioning 
proposal (Scenario I), two other scenarios are analysed where free allocation to address 
“carbon leakage” is based either on energy intensity above 3 % (Scenario II) or on trade 
intensity above 25 % (Scenario III). These scenarios reflect the recent discussion on 
competitiveness effects of climate policies in energy-intensive industries. In Germany, for 
example, the ministry of economics proposed to allocate permits free of charge to all energy-
intensive manufacturing industries, i.e. business entities where the purchases of energy 
products and electricity amount to at least 3 % of the production value (Council of the 
European Union 2003), while the ministry of the environment proposed to give free 
allowances to industries with a trade intensity above a threshold which has to be specified yet 
(Mrusek 2008). The estimations show that the scenarios do not have a significant impact on 
the auction volume: in all three scenarios the fraction of auctioned allowances is roughly more 
than two third already in 2013 and rises thereafter. In other words, auctioning will be indeed 
the basic principle for allocating allowances from 2013 onwards even when competitiveness 
concerns of energy-intensive industries are taken into account.  
Obviously, the drastic increase of auctioned allowances in contrast to free allocation in 
the past will change the market structure in Phase 3. For a given cap, with an augmenting 
auction supply the possibility to purchase allowances in the secondary market decreases.2 As 
a consequence, market liquidity is extracted suggesting a thinner secondary market than in 
earlier trading phases. In this context, we refer to a liquid market if firms can buy or sell 
allowances without causing a significant movement in the market price, i.e. firms act as price 
takers.3 As soon as this assumption has to be given up, the market is imperfect or illiquid. As 
illustration, one might think of a scale between zero and one, whereas the borders mark the 
two extreme cases of no and full auctioning. Moving from the left to the right border, the 
auction supply increases while, correspondingly, the liquidity of the secondary market 
decreases. Note that while in the secondary market firms’ net positions, i.e. excess supply or 
demand given the initial allocation, are traded, firms are able to cover in the auction their total 
                                                 
2 In a scheme based on grandfathering, liquidity in the secondary market is only created if firms are over or 
under supplied by the regulator. In a scheme based on auctioning, obviously there will be fewer deviations 
between firms’ allowance demand and the allocation because firms will adapt their bidding behaviour to their 
actual needs. 
3 This is one of the standard definitions of market liquidity for financial assets, see e.g. O’Hara (1998). 
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demand of allowances. Therefore, a certain amount of allowances which is allocated either via 
an auction or via grandfathering has a different effect on liquidity in the secondary market. 
This aspect underscores the importance of a correct auction design. 
 
Table 1: Total auctioning share in phase 3 under different scenarios 
Scenario 
I 
(EU proposal)
II 
(EI > 3 %) 
III 
(TI > 25 %)
Emissions 
(in MtCO2) 
 in % 
EU ETS sectors E
ne
rg
y 
in
te
ns
ity
 
(E
I)
 in
 %
 a  
Tr
ad
e 
in
te
ns
ity
 
(T
I)
 in
 %
 b  
2005 2013 2020   2013   2020 2013 2020 2013 2020
Pulp and paper 9.6 29.4 24 28 24 20 100 0 0 0 0
Basic chemicals 5.1 32.5 67 61 49 20 100 0 0 0 0
Glass and glass products 6.1 19.6 46 44 38 20 100 0 0 20 100
Cement, lime and plaster 12.4 5.5 110 98 86 20 100 0 0 20 100
Basic iron and steel 7.4 33.6 183 144 118 20 100 0 0 0 0
Aluminium 6.0 37.9 14 12 11 20 100 0 0 0 0
Refined petroleum prod. 0.2 5.0 101 96 84 20 100 20 100 20 100
Coke oven products 0.1 40.2 2 2 1 20 100 20 100 0 0
Electricity production   1510 1312 1172 100 100 100 100 100 100
Air transport d   151 169 161 20 100 0 0 0 0
Total   2208 1966 1744   
 Total auctioning share in % 73 100 68 72 69 79
a Energy intensity = energy purchase / turnover in 2005. Own calculations based on Eurostat. 
b Trade intensity = (value of exports to non-EU + value of imports from non-EU) / (turnover + value of imports 
from non-EU); e.g. Carbon Trust (2008). Own calculations based on Eurostat. 
c Own calculations based on Primes (2007) and European Commission (2007). 
d Aviation is energy and trade intensive, electricity production is only energy intensive, see e.g. Stern (2006). 
 
 
Why do we observe such a strong tendency towards auctioning? The NAP of Phase 1, mainly 
applying grandfathering, involved negotiations over allowances with a total value of about 
€27 billion per year.4 Given the proposal by the EC (EC 2008), between 2008 and 2012 the 
average volume of yearly allocated allowances will be 1.89 GtCO2. The total value of 
allowances will then be €47 billion per year (assuming an average price of €25/tCO2). 
Political decisions on how to allocate the allowance budget between sectors and individual 
installations, thus, naturally created intensive lobby activity by all participants to get the 
                                                 
4 According to the CITL data, the amount of allowances allocated to account holders was 2.096 (2.072, 2.145) 
GtCO2 in 2005 (2006, 2007). Multiplying these quantities with the quantity-based market price (2005: 
22.3€/tCO2, 2006: 15.1€/tCO2, 2007: 1.3€/tCO2) results in the total market value for Phase 1. 
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maximum possible share of rents. Consequently, a lot of energy and time was devoted by 
firms, governments, and consultancy to the enormous rent allocation process, obviously, 
contradicting one of the main objectives of the EU ETS – cost-efficiency. Furthermore, 
sophisticated allocation rules, which are highly influenced by lobby groups, are not in line 
with simplicity and transparency, two further objectives of the EC’s carbon regulation. An 
additional objective of emissions trading is to give reliable price signals. However, in Phase 1 
the EU ETS was unable to generate such price signals: With the publication of the 2005 
verified emissions data in April 2006, surplus allowances flooded the market and prices 
crashed by 60 % within one week as it became clear that participants had been granted around 
10 % more allowances than they actual needed to cover their 2005 emissions.  
To circumvent such price fluctuations and to ensure cost-efficiency as well as 
transparency and simplicity of the system, the preferred long-term option of the EC is full 
auctioning with free allocation only taking place during a transitional period based on 
harmonised EU-wide rules. Hereby, it is plausible to assume that transaction costs of an 
auction are less than the rent-seeking cost due to negotiating free allocation. Besides, no 
complex rules are needed to reward early actions to reduce emissions and to account for 
expected growth as well as for new installations and closures (Harrison 2002) or for the split 
between different sectors (Sijm 2002). Auctioning also avoids windfall profits and generates 
an outcome that may be perceived as “fair” because – in contrast to a free allocation – the 
“polluter pays” principle holds.5 More explicitly, there are additional aspects that support the 
decision to implement an auction-based allocation rule. Firstly, grandfathering as it is 
implemented currently (for instance in Germany) creates perverse incentives as the amount of 
allocated allowances depends on the firms’ fuel choice (e.g. Neuhoff et al. 2006). Power firms 
operating with coal get more allowances than firms using gas. This rule which is valid also for 
market newcomers prevents the switch from high- to low-carbon fossil fuel and increases the 
overall compliance costs of emissions abatement regulation. Last but not least, from the 
regulator’s perspective, switching from grandfathering to auctions has no effects on prices for 
energy intensive goods and services but raises public revenue and, therefore, offers the 
potential to reduce distortionary taxes. Competitiveness concerns of industries under 
auctioning might be addressed by other measures to avoid or at least reduce carbon leakage, 
e.g. the increased use of the CDM mechanism, the inclusion of importers into ETS or the 
introduction of border-tax adjustment (BTA) (Alexeeva-Talebi et al. 2008). BTA consists of 
                                                 
5 For the discussion of further arguments pro auction which concern distributional aspects see Hepburn et al. 
(2006). 
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tariffs on imported goods mimicking an (CO2) tax on domestic goods and rebates for the 
domestic tax on exported goods. In order to make BTA compatible with principles of the 
Word Trade Organization (WTO), tariffs must be set at the average costs of CO2 allowances 
excluding opportunity costs (Hepburn et al. 2006). Average costs, however, are only 
significant with auctions, and therefore, the introduction of auctions is a prerequisite to 
implement BTA. 
3. Carbon auctions in emissions trading schemes  
3.1 Example 
How the allocation rule can influence the trading scheme or more precisely, how important a 
well designed auction is, especially in case of a thin secondary market, we illustrate my means 
of an example. We consider 5 firms that are committed to participate in emissions trading. 
Each firm has business-as-usual emissions (baui) of 200 tCO2 such that in total 1,000 tCO2 
have to be covered by CO2 allowances, with i being the firm-specific index. Each firm has 
one abatement measure, which can be activated to reduce its emissions volume up to a 
maximum quantity of 200 tCO2 (potential abatement volume) at a certain price per abated 
tCO2. The price is given by the firm’s constant marginal abatement costs (MACi). The firms 
differ with respect to their MAC, such that there are low-, middle-, and high-cost abatement 
technologies (see Table 2), a quite realistic assumption in the EU ETS due to heterogeneous 
CO2 abatement technologies. When grandfathering is part of the allocation rule firms possess 
an initial stock of allowances, labeled by si. If only auctioning is applied, then firms’ initial 
allowance stock is empty. We assume that first the allowance allocation, i.e. the auction, takes 
place. Then, based on the auction outcome, that is the quantity purchased in the auction of 
firm i, qi, and the auction price pA, firms decide on their abatement volume ai. Note that we do 
not consider a secondary market after the auction as we assume that it will be illiquid in 
Phase 3 of the EU ETS anyway. Hence, by studying the auction only in combination with 
abatement decisions we can demonstrate best the importance of a suitable auction design 
when there is no secondary market that is able to absorb auction inefficiencies that are 
mispricing or misallocation of allowances. Let us consider the case, in which the regulator 
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decides on an ET budget of 900 allowances (tCO2)6 and considers three rules to allocate them 
that all include auctioning.7  
 
1. Each firm is grandfathered 160 allowances (i.e. si = 160) and the remaining 100 
allowances are auctioned. In the auction firms are only allowed to purchase 
allowances (one-sided auction). 
2. Each firm is grandfathered 160 allowances (i.e. si = 160) and the remaining 100 
allowances are auctioned. In the auction firms are allowed to purchase and to offer 
allowances (double auction). 
3. The whole ET budget of 900 allowances is auctioned (i.e. si = 0). In the auction firms 
are only allowed to purchase allowances (one-sided auction).8 Note that this scenario 
reflects the situations when there is no grandfathering, when banking from the 
previous trading phase is forbidden or when the ETS enters its first trading phase. In 
all situations firms do not have an initial stock of allowances. 
 
In the example, 100 tCO2 (the difference between total bau emissions of 1,000 tCO2 and the 
ET budget of 900 tCO2) have to be abated in total. Since the maximum abatement volume of 
each measure equals 200 tCO2, the target is achieved cost-efficiently by the cheapest 
abatement measure (owned by firm 5). Thus, the lowest MAC determine the true market 
price, labeled by p*, that reflects the market scarcity situation, i.e. p* = 10 € per allowance. 
Being interested in the influence of the auction design, we now investigate the auction 
outcome of the three different allocation rules that are labeled according to their incorporated 
institutions: grandfathering (GF), one-sided auction (A), and double auction (DA). Therefore, 
we need to make additional assumptions about the pricing rule in the auction and firms’ 
bidding behaviour. First, the auction price is determined by the market clearing price, i.e. the 
price where demand equals supply. As explained in more detail in Section 4.1 this is a 
standard auction pricing rule. Second, in the auction each firm i demands its whole shortage 
(i.e. the difference baui − si) as long as the auction price pA < MACi. If pA > MACi the firm 
stops bidding in the one-sided auction or switches to offering its whole stock of allowances in 
                                                 
6 In the following the units “tCO2” and “allowances” are used as synonyms. 
7 A detailed introduction into possible auction designs is given in Section 4.1 together with a motivation for the 
auction scenarios applied in the example. 
8 As the fourth combination (double auction with 100 % auctioning) generates the same results as the one-sided 
auction we refrain from presenting this scenario here. 
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the double auction, respectively. In other words, firms take their individual MAC as 
reservation price.9 Consequently, the auction serves first the bid of the firm with the highest 
MAC, then the firm with the second highest MAC and so on until the whole auction supply is 
allocated. The auction price then lies between the lowest winning bid and the highest loosing 
bid. To keep the example simple, we adopt the rule that the market clearing price equals to the 
highest losing bid. Thus, the example yields the following auction outcomes with resulting 
abatement activities (see also Table 2): 
 
Table 2: Example for allocation rules 
Firm  GF+A  GF+DA  A 
i baui MACi [€]  si qi ai  si qi ai  si qi ai 
1 200 50  160 40 0  160 40 0  0 200 0 
2 200 40  160 40 0  160 40 0  0 200 0 
3 200 30  160 20 20  160 40 0  0 200 0 
4 200 20  160 0 40  160 40 0  0 200 0 
5 200 10  160 0 40  160 -60 100  0 100 100 
Auction price pA [€]  30   10  10 
Explanation: Auction price pA, initial stock of allowances si, purchased auction quantity 
qi, and abatement volume after the auction ai with the three allocation rules. 
 
 
Allocation rule GF+A  
Auction: Each firm demands baui − si = 200 − 160 = 40 tCO2 at its MACi. The auction supply 
of 100 allowances is allocated to firms 1 and 2 which have the highest and second highest 
MAC. Each firm receives its bid and purchases qi = 40 allowances. Firm 3 gets only the 
remaining q3 = 20 allowances. As firm 3 does not receive is whole demanded quantity of 40 
allowances, it has the highest loosing bid. Thus, its MAC determine the auction price 
pA = 30 € per allowance, which is obviously higher than the market scarcity price p* = 10 € 
per allowance. Firms 4 and 5 do not receive anything from the auction. 
Abatement: After the auction firms 3, 4, and 5 still need allowances. If they consider 
pA = 30 € as a correct market price signal for current market scarcity, they all have an 
incentive to abate their still missing quantities (a3 = 20, a4 = 40, a5 = 40) at their individual 
                                                 
9 This behavioural assumption is reasonable as it constitutes an equilibrium strategy in a perfect secondary 
market for allowances, i.e. if a single buyer’s impact on the market price can be disregarded. Besides, this 
behaviour has been observed in ETS experiments, see e.g. Benz and Ehrhart (2007). 
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MAC of €30, €20, and €10 per allowance, respectively.10 This behaviour obviously prevents 
cost-efficiency that is reached when firm 5 abates, only. 
 
Allocation rule GF+DA 
Auction: Each firm demands again 40 allowances at its MACi. The auction supply of 100 
allowances is allocated as before to firms 1, 2, and 3. Additionally, as the auction allows for a 
selling position, firm 5 with the cheapest abatement technology offers its whole stock of 
allowances at its MAC of 10 € per allowance and thus sells 60 allowances; 20 allowances to 
firm 3 and 40 allowances to firm 4 (q3 = 20, q4 = 40). This leads to pA = p* = 10 € per 
allowance.  
Abatement: Taking pA = 10 € as market price signal, only firm 5 has an incentive to abate the 
whole reduction target of 100 tCO2 (a5 = 100). This constitutes also the cost-efficient strategy.  
 
Allocation rule A  
Auction: As firms do not have an initial stock of allowances, each firm demands 200 
allowances at its MACi. The auction supply of 900 allowances is allocated to firms 1 through 
4 (qi = 200) and to firm 5 (q5 = 100). Firm 5 has the highest loosing bid and determines the 
auction price pA = p* = 10 € per allowance.  
Abatement: As before, taking pA = 10 € as market price signal only firm 5 has an incentive to 
abate (a5 = 100) and thus behaves cost-efficiently.  
 
To summarize the examples’ results, taking individual MAC as reservation price all allocation 
rules allocate the allowances to the firms with the highest willingness to pay (derived from 
their MAC). Note that if this criterion is guaranteed by the auction design, the auction 
allocation is called efficient; see e.g. Krishna (2002). However, how reliable the auction price 
pA signals the market scarcity price p* – obviously an important criterion for correct 
abatement decisions – crucially depends on the allocation rule: If firms possess allowances 
already before the auction, as it is the case for rules GF+A and GF+DA, this criterion is met 
only for the double auction (GF+DA). The signal of its one-sided counterpart (GF+A) is 
                                                 
10 Note that at a market price of 30 € per allowance firm 3 is indifferent between buying allowances on the 
secondary market and abating emissions. For sake of simplicity, we assume that at the margin firms prefer to 
abate.  
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expected to exaggerate the market scarcity price and hereby prevents cost-efficiency. If firms 
do not possess allowances at the time of the auction this criterion is met for a one-sided 
auction as well as for a double auction.11 Thus, we can state the following result:  
Result 1 The auction design does not matter with respect to allocation efficiency but it 
matters with respect to price signaling: Only the double auction is able to create reliable 
price signals of emission allowances, independent if grandfathering or banking is allowed or 
not. 
Obviously for 2013, the first year of Phase 3, the best price signal still might be the market 
price at the end of Phase 2 in 2012, i.e. the price signaling effect of auctions after the start of 
Phase 3 is rather insignificant. However, the example’s result with respect to price signaling 
becomes important when high-volume auctions are conducted in future trading years of 
Phase 3 and future trading phases when we have to assume to have no perfect secondary 
market anymore that is able to signal reliable market prices before and after the auction.  
3.2 Criteria  
The following four main criteria are supposed to be fulfilled by a viable initial allocation rule 
for emission allowances, as also proposed by e.g. Benz and Ehrhart (2007), Cramton (2007) 
and the National Emissions Trading Task Force of Australia (NETT 2007). 
 
(1) Price signaling  
This criterion is associated with the generation of reliable price signals, which allow firms to 
profitably invest in cost-efficient abatement measures. A price signal is said to be reliable if it 
reflects the true scarcity of emission allowances in the system, which is necessary to identify 
the cheapest abatement measures – the most difficult but essential task in ETS. As most 
emissions-reducing investment projects, especially those with high energy efficiency, are 
costly and involve long implementation times, they require a long-term planning horizon. 
Therefore, the initial allocation mechanism should support the generation of reliable price 
signals at an early stage to lower uncertainty in the (future) secondary market and thus to 
foster cost-efficiency. As the shift from grandfathering to auctioning does not guarantee a 
                                                 
11 As mentioned already earlier, the scenario of an exclusive double auction is not illustrated by the example as it 
yields the same results as allocation rule A. 
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liquid secondary market anymore whose market price can serve as reliable signal, the ability 
of an auction to generate such price signals is decisive. 
 
(2) Allocation efficiency 
This criterion stipulates that the firms with the highest willingness to pay should receive the 
allowances. In other words, allowances are to be allocated to those firms above all others 
needing allowances to comply with their commitment. Since the allocator is not aware of 
individual needs and grandfathering does not take them into account, Criterion 2 only applies 
to auctions. As it is reasonable to assume that in Phase 3 trading on the secondary market is 
dominated by the auction, this criterion is highly relevant. Auctions have to reach as much as 
possible from allocation efficiency as the secondary market might not be able to correct 
inefficiencies.12 
 
(3) Simplicity, transparency, and credibility 
This criterion is related to past experiences with the NAP, where immense transaction costs 
have been accumulated to negotiate free allocation that has fostered the discussion of using 
auctions by the EC (see Section 2). When switching to auctions it must be guaranteed that 
their design is kept simple and transparent to lower the cost of entry (training, consulting) and 
to attract a high number of bidders. Many auction participants make market power and 
collusion less likely. Besides, the auction process is supposed to be non-manipulative and 
should build up confidence among bidders and credibility in the trading scheme. Thus, an 
institution with high reputation where rules and offered quantities are contractually specified 
is necessary, especially when an increasing auction volume has to be handled in an 
environment of several competing selling institutions, as it may be the case in the EU ETS; 
possibly each Member State conducts its own national auction scheme or several auction 
platforms arise with different auction mechanisms.  
Simplicity is not only desirable with respect to the allocation design but also to firm’s 
successful participation in the ETS. Ending up with a successful outcome (in the auction and 
secondary market), i.e. receiving the demanded number of allowances without paying too 
much, should not be based on complex bidding strategies incorporating a lot of outside 
                                                 
12 Note that Criteria 1 and 2, price signaling and allocation efficiency, imply Pareto efficiency where no mutually 
beneficial transactions are possible. 
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information (e.g. about other firms’ characteristics or total scarcity conditions). Firms’ 
simplest strategy one might think of is to bid straightforward, i.e. to tell their private valuation 
for one allowance, which is given by their marginal abatement costs. Thus, the allocation 
mechanism should guarantee that a simple strategy already yields a successful outcome as 
well as a more sophisticated one. Additionally, firms should have ex-post no incentive to 
change their bidding strategy.  
 
(4) Revenue raising  
Auctions have the advantage over grandfathering that they generate public revenue and offer 
the potential to reduce distortionary taxes. Thus, Criterion 4 also applies to auctions only. The 
capacity of an auction to raise reliable revenue streams is a relevant design criteria but it is not 
declared as primary objective of the auction design and should not be pursued at the expense 
of the other criteria. Revenues should be ideally recycled outside the scheme to prevent rent 
seeking on the revenue spending.13 
3.3 Auctioning: timing, volume, and products 
The timing of the auctions influences their ability to comply with Criteria 1-4. Generally, 
auctions benefit of a high reputation because of their ability to reveal information that helps to 
generate price signals (Criterion 1). Dependent on the auction design, the revealed 
information is reliable or not (see example in Section 3.1). However, in the environment of 
ETS the price signaling effect depends additionally on the timing of the auction. Obviously, 
the signaling effect is strongest if the auction is conducted well before the start of the ETS 
(early auctions) in order to plan and realize profitable abatement strategies with long lead 
times and long life times.14 For already operating ETS, as the EU ETS, only so-called spot 
auctions (auctions of allowances valid for the current trading phase) and advance auctions 
(auctions of allowances valid for future trading phases) are of relevance.  
Evidently, price signals from spot auctions have a rather short term effect on the 
secondary market. However, if they are conducted in regular time intervals they can guarantee 
                                                 
13 According to the EC at least 20 % of the auction revenues generated in Phase 3 should be used for green 
purposes such as contributing to research and development for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, to adaption 
measures, to avoiding deforestation or to address social aspects such as possible increases in electricity prices in 
lower and middle income classes (EC 2008). 
14 A recent example is the auctioning of allowances for the US RGGI scheme. While the scheme will start in 
2009, first allowances have been already auctioned in September 2008. 
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allowance supply for buyers and new entrants and lower market uncertainty. The latter aspect 
is particularly important in case of an illiquid and highly volatile secondary market as 
assumed for Phase 3 that is not able anymore to generate reliable price signals before and 
after the auction. Obviously, in case of a small auction supply or a perfectly operating (liquid) 
secondary market auctions might loose importance over time and are quickly dominated by 
the market (see the US SO2 market for example, Schmalensee et al. 1998). 
Advance auctions can also set (early) price signals for the future and ensure liquidity 
of allowances before the trading phase they can actually be used for. Hence, they might 
account for possible time delays at the start of a new trading phase and help to decide on 
investment projects having a long-term planning horizon, which spreads over several trading 
phases. Certainly, as there is no ban in banking between the trading phases of the EU ETS 
(EC 2008), the allowance purchased in the spot auction is the superior product: It can be used 
in either the current or any future trading phase, whereas the product of the advance auction 
can be used only in a later trading phase. Consequently, the allowance price in the spot 
auction must be at least as great as in the advance auction. Therefore, across trading phases 
we deal with inhomogeneous auctioned products whereas during a specific trading phase 
products are identical.15  
In principal, advance auctions can be considered as equivalent to futures markets for 
standardized contracts on CO2 allowances. However, in the context of Phase 3 the existence 
of a liquid futures market for Phase 3 allowances already before 2013 is rather implausible for 
the same reason why the secondary spot market might be illiquid; a high auction supply 
decreases the possibility to buy allowances on the market. Currently, only futures with expiry 
until 2012 are available. Thus, to reduce uncertainty for a power firm to be short in 2013 or 
later in Phase 3 a mix of spot and advance auctions for the ET budget is necessary.  
Result 2 Advance auctions (auctions of allowances for future trading phases), additional to 
spot auctions (auctions of allowances for the current trading phase), ensure liquidity in the 
future and thus reduce uncertainty in the EU ETS.  
                                                 
15 If market actors expect allowance prices to increase faster than the rate of interest, then the price of the spot 
auction will approximately equal the price of the advance auction; otherwise, the price of the spot product will be 
above the price of the advance product, see Cramton (2007). 
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4. Auction designs  
In the example of Section 3.1 we have briefly introduced two different types of auctions: the 
one-sided auction and the double auction. In the following, we first embed these two setups 
into possible auction designs and demonstrate their application in already existing trading 
schemes. We discuss their compliance with Criteria 1-4 and finally recommend an auction 
design for Phase 3. Note that illustrated by the example, we have to distinguish between two 
auction environments: an environment in which firms possess already emission allowances 
(via grandfathering or banking) and one in which they do not have allowances, yet. 
Obviously, for Phase 3 the first environment applies. 
4.1 Introduction into multiple-unit auctions 
In general before getting started, every regulator (or auctioneer) needs to specify the object 
that is to be auctioned. In case that he has several objects, he must decide whether to sell them 
separately in several auctions or in a single auction. As discussed in Section 3.3, emission 
allowances of one trading phase are sold in identical units of one tCO2. However, allowances 
from different trading phases are close but not perfect substitutes. Possibly, they constitute to 
a certain extend complementary units in case that future investment decisions are taken for 
more than one trading phase. In any case, we deal with multi-unit auctions for (almost) 
identical objects. Furthermore, the auctioneer has to be aware of the information that is 
available to him and to the bidders. It is reasonable to assume that he does not know the 
precise valuation for one allowance of each bidder. That is the maximum amount each bidder 
is willing to pay, which is given by firms’ individual marginal abatement costs. Otherwise 
there would be no need for an auction. Besides, bidders also may not know exactly the 
valuation of other bidders and even their private valuation might be difficult to assess (due to 
e.g. uncertainty about future fuel prices, product demand, and technology progress). Thus, the 
pure so-called private value situation does not apply for the allowance auction.16 This is 
enforced by the fact that the allowances can be traded in the secondary market, whereby the 
value of the allowance becomes the same to all bidders, however, unknown at the time the 
auction takes place – a so-called “common value” situation.  
Additionally, the auctioneer needs to specify the objectives that the auction should 
generate, which are in our case Criteria 1-4: price signaling, efficient allocation, and 
                                                 
16 The assumption of private values is most plausible when the value of the object to a bidder is derived from its 
private consumption or use alone and do not consider the opportunity to resale it (i.e. paintings, jewellery). 
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simplicity combined with transparency and credibility as main objectives, but also revenue 
raising. It is the auctioneer’s task to implement a set of rules that guarantees best these 
objectives. In general, he has the following possibilities for implementation: 
 Static (also single-round or sealed-bid) or dynamic auction. A static auction only 
consists of one round of bidding, in which bidders simultaneously and independently 
submit their bids. A purchase bid consists of two components, the quantity and the 
price, that the participant is willing to pay per unit. Contrary, in a dynamic auction 
bidding is an iterative process. In general, the auctioneer raises (decreases) the auction 
price in each round and bidders permanently must submit a quantity bid to signal their 
willingness to stay in the auction. This procedure is repeated until total demand is 
below (above) or equal to total supply. The units are then allocated at the prior price, 
and are rationed, if necessary, for those that reduced (increased) their quantity in the 
last round. The activity rule is simply that each buyer cannot increase (decrease) its 
quantity as the price rises (falls). This auction is also called ascending (descending) 
clock auction, in which a clock symbolizes the current round and indicates the 
corresponding auction price. The clock continues until the market clears (see e.g. 
Cramton 1998). The motivation for using a dynamic auction rather than a sealed bid 
auctions is that it allows for better price discovery. Bidders can learn from the bidding 
process and condition their bids on this information as explained in detail in Cramton 
(1998) and Ausubel and Cramton (2002). 
 One-sided or double (also two-sided) auction. In a one-sided auction, the auctioneer, 
i.e. in our case the government, serves as the exclusive seller whereas in a double 
auction there are several sellers allowed; additional to the government firms can offer 
their allowances in the auction. Double auctions are also called two-sided auctions. 
 Uniform or discriminatory (also pay-as-your-bid) price rule. A price rule specifies the 
price that a winner has to pay for the unit(s) in the auction. In a uniform price auction 
all bidders pay the same auction price per unit, which is the market clearing price 
when bidders’ demand meets the auction supply. In a pay-as-your-bid auction, the 
winners pay the price they have stated in their bids. This means that bidders may pay 
different prices. There is theoretical and empirical evidence that the uniform pricing 
rule is to be preferred in the context of multi-unit auctions. According to Friedman 
(1991) the uniform price format leads to more truthful bidding because the fear of the 
winner's curse is reduced. Besides, it is strategically simpler as it reduces bid preparation 
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costs and thus encourages more bidders to participate. Reinhart (1992) and Chari and 
Weber (1992) also argue that uniform price auctions reduce market manipulation. 
 Reserve price. By setting a reserve price the auctioneer defines the minimum price for 
the sold unit(s) to prevent a decline in prices below a certain threshold. Riley and 
Samuelson (1981) discuss the optimal reserve price in detail. 
 Sequential or simultaneous auction. This distinction is only relevant when different 
types of units are sold. In a sequential auction each type is sold in separate auctions 
conducted one after another while in a simultaneous auction all types of units are sold 
in one auction. According to Porter et al. (2006) and Cramton (2007) a simultaneous 
auction can guarantee best the generation of efficient auction prices when different 
types of units are sold. 
4.2 International experience with auctions for emissions trading schemes 
The one-sided auction mechanism constitutes the most common and easiest format for 
auctioning identical objects. For instance, in Phase 1 of the EU ETS Hungary, Ireland, and 
Lithuania conducted static one-sided auctions; whereas dynamic sequential one-sided auctions 
have already been applied by the US market for NOx as well as by the UK ETS for CO2 
allowances. However, in all these markets the sole reason for auctioning was to raise revenue 
to finance administrative costs. Besides, the insignificant budget-share of auctioning in 
Hungary (2.5 %), Ireland (0.75 %), and Lithuania (1.5 %) weakens the auctions’ importance. 
Consequently, we abstain from a detailed analysis of all these auction designs as with respect 
to auctioning in Phase 3 the auction volume will be significantly higher and other objectives 
come to the fore by the EC, see Criterion 1-4.17  
However, the US Acid Rain Program for SO2 permits – the most prominent ETS 
before the EU ETS – conducts static double auctions with the objective to generate price 
signals and an efficient allocation (Cason 1993, Schmalensee et al. 1998). Consequently, a 
closer look at SO2 auctions might be a good source of inspiration for developing an 
appropriate EU carbon auction design, even if the annual auction supply of 2.8 % is rather 
small. Explicitly, SO2 permits are sold via annual static discriminatory auctions with a “low-
                                                 
17 For a detailed description of those auction designs we refer to Fazekas (2008).  
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offer-to-high-bid” matching rule.18 However, it turned out that the discriminatory price rule 
induces sellers and buyers to misrepresent their true valuation of the emission permits and to 
state lower asking and bid prices.19 The results of the first conducted auctions were low 
trading activity and an auction price that was smaller than the expected price in the secondary 
market that contradicts Criterion 1. However, in the course of the time both prices converged. 
To prevent such situations, in which the auction design invites bidders to take strategic 
considerations, the design needs to comply with Criterion 3. That is, successful participation 
should not base on complicated strategic bidding behaviour. The auction rules should give 
incentive to tell the true valuation for one emission allowance (given by individual MAC), 
which constitutes the easiest bidding strategy. This criteria is in line with the idea of Cason 
and Plott (1996) who conducted an experiment for testing the SO2 auction with uniform 
pricing reflecting thus the allocation rule GF+DA studied in our example in Section 3.1. In 
their study they obtain a higher allocation efficiency level (Criterion 2), a more truthful 
revelation of underlying values and costs, and thus more accurate price information 
(Criterion 1).  
With the gained knowledge from the example in Section 3.1 and the US SO2 auction 
we preliminarily conclude that a uniform double auction seems so be an appropriate candidate 
for Phase 3, especially when grandfathering is still part of the allocation rule. Academic 
support comes from the experiment conducted by Benz and Ehrhart (2007) who test several 
allocation rules for emission allowances. They conclude that with uniform double auctions the 
regulator is always on the safe side, as independent on firms’ bidding behaviour, bidding 
individual MAC or a more sophisticated strategy, all criteria are fulfilled.  
4.3 US and Australian emissions trading schemes 
The two most recent developments in the area of ETS come from the US and Australia. In the 
US, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) – a cooperative effort by 10 North-
eastern and Mid-Atlantic states to reduce CO2 emissions in the electricity sector by means of 
emissions trading starting in 2009 – has agreed to auction at least 25 % of their emission 
allowance budget. The first auction was held already in September 2008. However, contrary 
                                                 
18 Bids are ranked from highest to lowest. Based on this ranking the governmental auction supply is allocated 
first. The received firms’ offers are then matched with the remaining bids, such that the lowest minimum offer 
serves the highest remaining bid. 
19 The lower the stated asking price of a seller, the less likely it is that any other seller has a lower bid, which 
increases the probability of winning. As with a discriminative price rule the buyer has to pay his bid price, he 
also has an incentive to under reveal his valuation. Thus, there is a downward bias on the auction price. 
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to academic advice by Cramton (2007) to conduct dynamic uniform double auctions, the 
program recently has decided to use a static one-sided auction format to allocate the 
allowances (RGGI 2008).20  
After the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, Australia plans to implement a national 
ETS by the end of 2010. In a first proposal, the regulatory authority, the National Emissions 
Trading Taskforce (NETT), suggests implementing an allocation rule using both, 
grandfathering and auctioning, and votes for the dynamic uniform double auction (NETT 
2007). 
4.4 Danish and German “direct sales” 
Obviously, a wide variety of selling institutions falls under the rubric of “an auction”. So far, 
when using the term “auction” we referred to the standard institution as a one-time event held 
by third party intermediaries, the auctioneers. However, in Phase 1 instead of a standard 
auction the Danish government agreed on selling the budget-share of auctioning (5 %) 
directly in the secondary market via a professional broker. As the objective was to maximize 
revenue, selling took only place in high-price periods. This way of auctioning is also 
implemented by the German government for the years 2008 and 2009 of Phase 2 to annually 
auction 8.8 % of the total national allowance budget (Zuteilungsgesetz 2007). Here, the 
governmental auction supply is offered continuously via a professional financial institution in 
almost equal portions (dependent on current liquidity of the most liquid futures contract) on 
standard trading platforms of the secondary market (BMU 2008).  
Note that the mechanism of a double auction, whose total auction supply is the sum of 
the supply issued by the government and the firms for each possible price, is principally 
equivalent to a continuous trading scheme, in which the governmental supply is offered on 
trading platforms for allowances in regular and publicly announced time intervals (direct 
sales). The main problem of this selling alternative, however, is that with a high auction 
supply the volume gets too large to handle by the exchanges without having an impact on the 
market price. This strategy is thus prone to induce market uncertainty, especially as there are 
no generally accepted standards and rules for the selling strategy (e.g. announcement of the 
selling date, offered and sold volume). Consequently, the continuation of rather in-transparent 
direct sales in Phase 3 will not serve as appropriate selling institution, mainly in regard to 
                                                 
20 This auction design, a static one-sided auction, was tested experimentally, too. See Holt et al. (2007). 
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other Member States. Assuming that in 2007 Germany – responsible for about 20 % of the 
total ET budget21 – allocates allowances exclusively via continuous direct sales, the 
responsible financial institution gains market power and might influence the market price. In 
contrast, credibility is enhanced best if the selling of allowances is organized by an external 
auction platform with high reputation where rules and quantities are contractually specified 
and made public in order to minimize the amount of discretion in the process. A consistent 
auction format guarantees best transparency and non-manipulation. This aspect is important 
especially in the long run perspective when the secondary market is assumed to be not perfect. 
Particularly, in artificial markets such as ETS regulatory uncertainty may be reduced by a 
credible commitment of the regulator to sell an ex-ante specified quantity of allowances by an 
external auction platform in the market. This line of reasoning is based on the well-known 
argument for “rules rather than discretion” by Kydland and Prescott (1977) in order to avoid 
time-inconsistency of public policy. 
Result 3 As in Phase 3 (2013-2020) about two third of the total emissions trading budget is 
going to be auctioned, conducting standard auctions is superior to direct sales. 
5. Auction recommendation for Phase 3 of the EU ETS 
A profound decision for a specific auction design makes it necessary to analyse the 
environment, in which the auction for Phase 3 is going to be embedded. First, contrary to the 
US RGGI and Australian ETS, the EU ETS has been established already in 2005 and has 
developed the infrastructure for the spot and futures markets. Thus, from the pool of auction 
types introduced in Section 3.3 we only have to consider spot and advance auctions. Early 
auctions are not relevant anymore by definition. In addition, at this point the volume of 
banked allowances from Phase 2 to Phase 3 is difficult to assess due to the lack of verified 
emissions. It could serve as indicator for liquidity in the secondary market at the beginning of 
Phase 3. Evidently, in case of a small volume, a well designed auction would be more 
important as the secondary market will not be able to absorb auction inefficiencies. In order to 
be prepared for all possible market scenarios, optimally, an auction design is required that can 
deal with all associated uncertainties. In other words, the right auction design may serve as 
insurance against a possibly illiquid secondary market. 
                                                 
21 Own calculations based on CITL data (accessed in August 2008). 
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Consequently, the environment of Phase 3 reflects the two situations of the example in 
Section 3.1 where firms possess a positive stock of allowances, i.e. allocation rules GF+DA 
and GF+A are relevant. Remember that if bidders take their individual MAC as reservation 
price both the one-sided auction and the double auction generate an efficient allocation of the 
allowances (Criterion 2). However, with respect to price signaling, Criterion 1, the double 
auction performs better than the one-sided auction. The economic explanation for this result is 
quite intuitive. If only the government sells allowances in the auction (i.e. one-sided), only 
those companies which have relatively high abatement costs have an incentive to participate 
in the auction (in the example: firms 1, 2, and 3); net sellers are not expected to participate in 
the auction (in the example: firm 5). Thus the companies that will participate in the auction 
represent a biased sample of all companies that are involved in the ETS. If bidders do not take 
this issue into account the auction becomes more competitive than the later secondary market 
leading its closing price to overestimate the future development of the market price. For this 
reason, it is appropriate to extend the auction and allow firms that already possess allowances 
to sell them in the auction at a more reliable price. This adds complexity but as a consequence 
of a less biased sample of participants the auction will generate more reliable price signals 
than its one-sided counterpart.  
We chose the uniform price rule as it is simple and transparent. There is one auction 
price for all winners and, as motivated in Section 4.1, it gives stronger incentives to tell firms’ 
true abatement costs (Criterion 3). Obviously, the best signaling effect is achieved if the 
auction is run dynamically, more precise with an ascending clock, such that it provides the 
bidders with information through the process of bidding (see Section 4.1). Last but not least, 
to account for the possibility to buy and sell allowances for future trading phases, we 
recommend implementing a simultaneous dynamic double auction, i.e. to run a spot and 
advance auction simultaneously. Hereby, it is important that the bidding rules are kept as 
simple as possible to attract the maximum number of potential bidders and guarantee efficient 
prices for both types of allowances. That is, the price of the superior spot auction product 
must be at least as high as the price of the inferior advance auction product. Running two 
independent auctions sequentially cannot control for the latter issue (see Cramton 2007). The 
simultaneous auction gives bidders the opportunity to shift demand between Phase t and 
Phase t+1 allowances through the auction in order to account for their potential 
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substitutability. Of course, bidding rules need to be designed as such that they prevent from 
non-monotone bidding behaviour.22 
To summarize, the auction we recommend is a simultaneous dynamic uniform double 
auction also known as simultaneous two-sided ascending clock auction. It is able to fulfil 
Criteria 1-4. There is theoretical as well as empirical evidence that this auction is well suited 
to allocate emission allowances. Ausubel and Cramton (2004) prove that in absence of market 
power final prices of the simultaneous ascending clock auction correspond to the competitive 
equilibrium and the allocation is therefore efficient. This result holds for units that constitute 
substitutes as well as complements.23 
Result 4 The simultaneous uniform double auction in its dynamic form is able to fulfil best the 
criteria to a viable allocation rule for Phase 3 of the EU ETS and at the same time to absorb 
possible regulatory uncertainties with respect to Phase 3. 
Realizing this auction, the following important aspects have to be considered by the 
auctioneer: How often should the auction take place? How is the allowance share offered in 
spot and advance auctions? How to combine the governmental and firms’ auction supply? To 
guarantee a source to purchase allowances gradually through a trading phase, quarterly 
auctions might be appropriate, as also proposed by Cramton (2007) and Holt et al. (2007). 
Obviously, the allowance share of forward auctions depends on the cap announcement by the 
EC: The earlier cap decisions are taken before the beginning of the upcoming trading phase, 
the longer Phase t spot auctions and Phase t+1 forward auctions can be run simultaneously. In 
practice this means that beginning from 2010 onwards, a certain fraction of “Phase 3 
allowances” could be auctioned already. Thus, countries which employ partial auctioning in 
Phase 2 can implement spot and forwards auctions already simultaneously. From 2013 
onwards only Phase 3 allowances are auctioned until the EC has decided on the cap for the 
next trading phase (Phase 4), possibly from 2021 to 2028. After then, advance auctions for 
Phase 4 allowances are again implemented. Assuming, that future trading phases last for a 
                                                 
22 As emphasized in Section 2, raising of auction revenues (Criterion 4) is not a primary objective of the auction 
design. We are not aware of studies that show that the recommended auction generates lower revenues then its 
alternatives. We assume that there are no significant differences in revenues. 
23 In a recent experimental study, the one-sided counterpart of the simultaneous ascending clock auction has been 
proposed already by Porter et al. (2006) for the Virginia’s NOx allowance auction. Testing several auctions, the 
authors found that the ascending clock performed best, as measured by revenue maximisation and allocation 
efficiency. However, due to time constraints the auction could be implemented only sequentially in the field. 
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period of eight years and the cap is always set about four years in advance, a 50-50-split of the 
ET budget between the spot and forward auctions might be plausible.  
Besides, we recommend aggregating the governmental and firms’ auction supply 
curves. This yields a unique supply curve indicating the quantity that is sold at various prices, 
optimally starting at a reserve price. To make participation for sellers more comfortable, firms 
should be allowed to submit their individual (upward sloping) supply curves, a sequence of 
price-quantity pairs, before the auction starts. The publication of the aggregated supply curve 
would then reveal important information to the demand side that enforces the process of price 
signaling. 
 Generally, the regulator’s costs of the auction depend on the complexity of the design 
and the auction frequency. Obviously, the implementation of a dynamic auction is more costly 
than its static counter part. However, as electronic markets for European emission allowance 
trading already exist they can be used as auction platforms. Thus, implementation costs 
should have no significant effect, even for a dynamic two-sided setup as both buying and 
selling positions are implemented already. For example, in 2006 the Hungarian electronic 
auction was implemented on euets.com and in 2007 on the Climex trading platform that also 
conducted Lithuania’s auctions.24 The additional transaction costs of an auction incurred to 
the bidding firm are assumed to be only high at the beginning (consulting, training, working 
time) but can be disregarded as soon as regular participation is part of the day-to-day 
business.  
According to the EC, the auctions must be conducted in an open, non-discriminatory 
manner (EC 2008), i.e. there are no restrictions on participation such that all firms have full 
access in case of the existence of several auction platforms. Dependent on potential bidders, 
activity rules on bidding behaviour are necessary to restrict influence on the auction outcome. 
However, the risk of executing market power in the EU ETS, presumably coming from the 
electricity sector, is rather small. In 2007 the electricity firm with the largest share of 
allowances only accounted for 7.2 % of the ET budget allocated to the electricity sector. 
Additionally, calculating the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index – a standard measure for market 
concentration – for this sector in 2007 yields 0.0035 indicating that no electricity firm 
                                                 
24 Detailed information to both auction designs can be downloaded on http://www.euets.com/content/Download, 
accessed in August 28, 2008. 
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possessed any real market power so their influence on the auction outcome will be 
insignificant.25 
6. Conclusion 
Our paper is motivated by the “Climate action and renewable energy package” proposed by 
the European Commission in the beginning of 2008. It suggests auctioning as basic principle 
for allocation for the upcoming third trading phase of the EU ETS (Phase 3) that runs from 
2013 to 2020. Overall, it is estimated that at least two third of the total quantity of allowances 
will be auctioned in 2013, to be increased to 100 % by 2020. These fractions are quite robust 
given different assumptions with respect to the amount of grandfathering in the non-electricity 
sectors. We emphasize the importance of a properly chosen auction design as the significantly 
higher auction share, compared to the past and current trading phase, might yield a thin 
secondary market for CO2 allowances. We then elaborate main criteria that a viable auction 
design is supposed to fulfil and propose a specific auctions design for Phase 3.  
As criteria we state that the auction should create early and reliable price signals to 
support correct abatement decisions. The auction should also allocate the allowances to the 
firms that need them most, i.e. to the firms with the highest marginal abatement costs. 
Additionally, it should be designed simple and transparent to enhance trust and credibility of 
the market in the trading scheme and thus enforce intensive participation. Studying the 
general auction literature and evaluating already existing auctions for emission allowances, 
we receive a pool of potential auction candidates. We conclude that the most common auction 
design – the one-sided uniform auction – does not comply with all proposed criteria as it is 
not able to guarantee reliable price signals. Besides, we discourage from direct sales as 
alternative to standard auctions as with an increasing auction volume they might have an 
impact on the market price and therefore cause price uncertainty in the trading scheme. We 
argue that the regulator might be on the “safe side” by applying a uniform double auction, 
preferably in a dynamic manner. In addition, we conclude that auctioning allowances of future 
trading phases is necessary to reduce future price uncertainty. Most effectively, this can be 
realized by an auction that offers allowances of the current and successive trading phase 
simultaneously. To sum up, we propose a simultaneous dynamic uniform double auction. 
                                                 
25 According to own calculations based on CITL data (accessed in August 2008). 
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